The Bureau of Land Management\u27s Finalized Hydraulic Fracturing Rule on Tribal Lands: a Responsibility or Intrusion? by Moran, Kerstie B.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 39 | Number 2
2016
The Bureau of Land Management's Finalized
Hydraulic Fracturing Rule on Tribal Lands: a
Responsibility or Intrusion?
Kerstie B. Moran
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Natural
Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized administrator of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kerstie B. Moran, The Bureau of Land Management's Finalized Hydraulic Fracturing Rule on Tribal Lands: a Responsibility or Intrusion?,





THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S FINALIZED 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RULE ON TRIBAL LANDS: A 
RESPONSIBILITY OR INTRUSION? 
Kerstie Moran* 
“Our entire tribal culture and existence is based on the principle 
that the land equals the people, us; destroy one and you destroy 
the other,” [Corey] Sanders wrote to his tribal representative. 
“Yes, it’s true our tribe needs money, and it’s nice to get a 
royalty check every month, but what are we giving up to get it?”1 
I. Introduction 
On May 11, 2012, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed a 
regulation dealing with hydraulic fracturing of oil and gas on federal and 
Indian lands.2 The initially published rule spurred a vast number of 
opinionated reviews criticizing the BLM for imposing unnecessary 
regulations on an already heavily encumbered energy industry.3 In response 
to these outcries, and the approximately 177,000 comments received on the 
initially proposed regulation, the BLM published a supplemental version of 
this regulation on May 16, 2013.4 The proposed regulation’s revisions 
integrate a number of interests held by tribes, environmentalists, and 
operators. Although the rule was projected to be finalized in the fall of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Curt Brown, Taking a Stand on Their Sacred Land: “Keepers of the Earth” 
Struggle to Come to Terms with North Dakota’s Oil Boom, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Feb. 25, 2014, http://www.startribune.com/local/233854981.html. Sanders is a 
Native of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota.  Id. 
 2. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and 
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27691 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 
3160). 
 3. Szonja Ludvig, The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional, Environmental, and 
Religious Considerations of Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands, 2013 BYU L. REV. 727 
(2014), available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2013/iss3/13; David 
Blackmon, BLM’s Fracking Rule – A Solution Vainly Searching for a Problem, FORBES 
(Aug. 26, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/08/26/blms-
fracking-rule-a-solution-vainly-searching-for-a-problem/.  
 4. See Press Release, Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior 
Releases Updated Draft Rule for Hydraulic Fracturing on Public and Indian Lands for Public 
Comment (May 16, 2013), available at http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2013/ 
may/nr_05_16_2013.html.  
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2014,5 the completed rule was not published until March 20, 2015.6 A press 
release by the Department of Interior (DOI) briefly describes the final rule 
and its standards that are to take effect 90 days from the release date.7 Prior 
to the final publication, over 1.5 million public comments were submitted 
to the DOI for consideration.8 Among several other rule components 
detailed in the following sections, the rule broadly seeks to improve safety 
and enhance groundwater protection by updating requirements for well-
bore integrity, wastewater disposal management, and public disclosure of 
chemicals.9  
Of the more than 100,000 oil and gas wells situated on federally 
managed lands, over 90 percent use hydraulic fracturing to extract valuable 
oil and gas hydrocarbons trapped within impermeable layers of rock deep 
below the earth’s surface.10 Therefore, the vast majority of oil and gas 
operations on federally managed lands will be affected by these regulations. 
As a result, the rule has conjured up a great deal of concern amongst 
industry leaders and affected parties. Those opposed to the new BLM 
regulation argue existing state and tribal regulations provide adequate 
oversight of hydraulic fracturing.11 Many have gone so far as to support the 
notion that the proposed regulation “will undoubtedly insert an unnecessary 
layer of rigidity into the permitting and development process [of hydraulic 
fracturing].”12 Commentators challenge the BLM’s most recent rule to 
regulate oil and gas production on tribal lands, believing it infringes on 
tribal sovereignty.13 For many tribes hoping to find economic stability 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Abigail Faulkner Jones, Draft Final BLM Rules Under White House Review, SHALE 
ENERGY LAW BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.shaleenergylawblog.com/oil-gas/draft-final-
blm-rules-under-white-house-review/. 
 6. Press Release, Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Department 
Releases Final Rule to Support Safe, Responsible Hydraulic Fracturing Activities on Public 
and Tribal Lands, DOI (Mar. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release, Interior Department 
Releases Final Rule], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ interior-department-
releases-final-rule-to-support-safe-responsible-hydraulic-fracturing-activities-on-public-and-tri 
bal-lands.cfm. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Ludvig, supra note 3. 
 12. John M. Broder, New Proposal on Fracking Gives Ground to Industry, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/new-fracking-rule-is-issued-by-obama 
-administration.html?_r=0.  
 13. Ludvig, supra note 3, at 740. 
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through increased drilling efforts, federal regulation is seen as adding 
“more bureaucratic hurdles for prospective lessees on tribal lands.”14  
Even still, other tribes, such as the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa 
Indians, feel the hazards associated with hydraulic fracturing are far too 
severe, and as a result have completely banned such drilling techniques.15 
Because tribes similar to the Turtle Mountain Band would elect to have 
stronger environmental protections in lieu of economic development, they 
are unlikely to oppose federal efforts to add environmental protections 
against such hazards as water contamination, improper wastewater disposal, 
and air pollution. Contrary to popular belief, the BLM insists that the new 
rule will streamline hydraulic fracturing on tribal lands held in trust by the 
DOI, and that it will not hinder tribes’ ability to govern drilling efforts.16 
Faced with balancing a number of differing interests, the BLM’s attempt to 
create a comprehensive rule that satisfies everyone seems next to 
impossible. The BLM is essentially left with two losing options: (1) sit idle 
and allow local, state, and tribal regulations to control the industry, which 
may result in destruction of tribal lands and environmental damage; or (2) 
place federal regulations on hydraulic fracturing operations and potentially 
risk impeding economic growth for tribes that desperately need to decrease 
unemployment and alleviate poverty.  
Unconventional drilling practices, including hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling, have allowed increased access to shale oil and gas 
development.17 Although these technological advances have indisputably 
led to the extraction of once unattainable resources, the rapid expansion of 
this practice has caused widespread public concern about whether 
fracturing can contaminate underground water sources.18 Other concerns 
include whether the chemicals used in fracturing should be disclosed to the 
public and whether there is adequate management of well integrity and the 
“flowback” fluids that return to the surface during and after fracturing 
operations.19  
                                                                                                                 
 14. Eloise Ogden, Tex Hall: Proposed Fracking Regs Will Hurt Energy Development on 
Reservations, MHA NATION: NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.mhanation.com/main2/ 
Home_News/Home_News_2012/News_2012_03_March/news_2012_march30.html. 
 15. See Turtle Mountain Tribal Council Res. TMBC627-11-11 (Nov. 29, 2011), 
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/62-2011/docs/pdf/ts032612appendixd.pdf. 
 16. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 
31636, 31636 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
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The BLM, together with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), has the task 
of overseeing approximately fifty-six million subsurface acres of land held 
in trust by the federal government on behalf of tribes and individual Indian 
owners under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA).20 Rising 
concerns of environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing on these tribal 
lands has compelled the BLM to provide Indian lands with the same level 
of protection it provides to public lands. The initially proposed rule, 
supplemental proposed rule and finalized rule seek to 
modernize BLM’s management of hydraulic fracturing 
operations by ensuring that hydraulic fracturing operations 
conducted on the public mineral estate [and Indian lands] . . . 
follow certain best practices, including: (1) The public disclosure 
of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing operations on Federal 
and Indian lands; (2) Confirmation that wells used in fracturing 
operations meet appropriate construction standards; and (3) A 
requirement that operators put appropriate plans in place for 
managing flowback waters from fracturing operations.21  
The question thus remains, is this regulation simply a means by which the 
federal government seeks to constrain tribal sovereignty and exercise its 
authority, or is it a necessary legislative action to more adequately and 
efficiently govern oil and gas production in the best interest of the tribes?  
This comment will focus on the BLM’s hydraulic fracturing regulation 
and the potential effects it will have on Native American tribal lands. This 
comment can be distinguished from other comments that have been 
published on the BLM regulation and its impacts on tribes by looking more 
broadly at both sides of the issue and offering alternative solutions for tribes 
seeking safe and effective energy development. Part II discusses the general 
areas to be addressed by (A) looking at the financial impacts of increased 
oil and gas development on tribal lands, (B) analyzing the steps Congress 
has taken thus far to regulate oil and gas development on tribal lands, and 
(C) examining the BLM’s obligation to regulate tribal lands held in trust by 
the federal government. Part III discusses the particular issues surrounding 
the BLM regulation by analyzing (A) whether hydraulic fracturing on tribal 
lands should be regulated through local or federal efforts, and (B) whether 
hydraulic fracturing causes environmental damage. Next, Part III (C) 
reviews the major elements of the recently published BLM regulation. Part 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
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IV suggests options for tribes that seek to resolve the divide between tribal 
self-governance over energy development and protecting tribal lands from 
unnecessary destruction. Although the BLM’s regulation will affect Indian 
and federal lands alike, the effects on federal lands are not within the scope 
of this comment.  
II. Contextual Background Synopsis 
A. The Possibility of Financial Independence for Tribes 
Increasing political instability around the globe continues to place 
pressure on the United States to become more energy independent. 
Achieving greater energy independence has become a reality through 
advances in unconventional drilling techniques such as horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing. Despite its more recent uptick in public exposure, 
hydraulic fracturing is not a new technique.22 Since the early fifties, the 
basic concept was used to stimulate production in old oil and gas wells. 
Hydraulic fracturing has made the production of oil and gas from 
impermeable rock formations in the earth’s subsurface, known as “shale” 
formations, profitable and has produced additional resources from 
reservoirs that were once thought to be completely drained.23  Hydraulically 
fracturing a well is done by forcing water, usually mixed with proppants 
(sand or beads to hold the fractures open) and chemicals (to reduce friction 
and kill bacteria) down a wellbore (the actual hole that forms the well) at 
extremely high pressure in order to create or expand fractures in the shale 
rock formation. The proppants act as wedges and allow the oil and/or gas to 
flow freely from the rock formation in which it is trapped.24  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) briefly describes 
hydraulic fracturing as a “well stimulation process used to maximize the 
extraction of underground resources; including oil, natural gas, geothermal 
energy, and even water.”25 The BLM estimates that about 90% of wells 
drilled on federal and Indian lands are stimulated using hydraulic fracturing 
                                                                                                                 
 22.  Zachary Lees, Note, Anticipated Harm, Precautionary Regulation and Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 575, 578 (2012). 
 23. Natural Gas Extraction – Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/hydrau 
licfracturing (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/gro 
undwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm (last visited May 2, 2012). 
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techniques (approximately 3400 wells per year).26 Several Indian 
reservations are located in known “shale play areas” and contain large 
amounts of undeveloped or underdeveloped oil-rich areas. Industry demand 
for mineral leases conveying shale formations has drastically increased, 
resulting in equally drastic monetary success for tribes.27 According to the 
BIA, in 2012 alone “energy and mineral resources generated over $701 
million in royalty revenue paid to Indian mineral owners.”28 In the last three 
years, the BIA and other government energy departments have collectively 
assisted tribes in the negotiation of forty-eight leases for oil and gas under 
the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA), covering 
approximately 2.75 million acres and amounting to about $45 million in 
bonuses—upfront per-acre payments made to mineral owners as 
consideration for oil and gas leases.29 Through royalties and working 
interests, these leases are projected to produce an additional $20 billion in 
revenue to Indian mineral owners over the life of the leases.30  
Because of the enormous success with shale gas, natural gas has become 
abundant and cheap for consumers in America.31 The lower price of natural 
gas benefits consumers and the electric power generating industry alike by 
lowering the cost of home heating and electricity.32 Eventually, this higher 
demand will create higher prices, and new exploration for natural gas is 
likely to ensue.33 “One unanticipated scenario is that natural gas may 
become so abundant that it be possible to export as liquefied natural gas, 
creating new markets for natural gas produced from Indian lands.”34  
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) offers additional 
insightful data pertaining to mineral development on Indian lands. Crude oil 
and natural gas were found to represent 29% and 22%, respectively, of 
fossil fuel sales from production on Indian lands in fiscal year (FY) 2013.35 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 
31636, 31638 (proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160) 
 27. Oil and Gas Outlook in Indian Country, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1, http:// 
www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xieed/documents/document/idc1-024535.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 
2015). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 4.  
 32. Id.   
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SALES OF FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCED FROM FEDERAL AND 
INDIAN LANDS, FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2013, at 4 (June 2014), available at http://www. 
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“Sales of crude oil produced on Indian lands increased a fourth consecutive 
year, by 48% to forty-six million barrels in FY 2013 (Table 3), the highest 
level between FY 2003 and FY 2013.”36 According to a recent EIA study, 
Indian lands account for 1% of total natural gas production, less than 1% of 
total natural gas plant liquids production, a little more than 1% of sales of 
total crude oil production, and about 2% of total coal production in the 
United States.37 Despite the fact that Indian lands only constitute 5% of 
total land area in America,38 experts have estimated that up to 10% of the 
nation’s available energy resources can be found under these lands.39 
Attributed in large part to unconventional drilling techniques, the EIA 
estimates that sales from production on Indian lands, which account for less 
than 7% of total federal and Indian land production, increased by 9% in FY 
2013.40 Crude oil production from Indian lands increased 360% from ten 
million barrels in FY 2003 to forty-six million barrels in FY 2013.41 Nearly 
all of this increase took place in FY 2010 due to a greater incidence of 
hydraulic fracturing, with the majority of the increase occurring in the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation in the western part of North Dakota.42 
One example of tribes experiencing economic profits from increased oil 
and gas production through hydraulic fracturing is the Three Affiliated 
Tribes of Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara (MHA) Nation located atop the oil-
rich Bakken Formation in North Dakota.43 In the latest oil and gas 
assessment for the Bakken Formation, the U.S. Geological Survey of the 
DOI found that “these world-class formations contain even more energy 
resource potential than previously understood,” with an estimated mean oil 
resource of 3.65 billion barrels (BBO) of undiscovered, technically 
                                                                                                                 
eia.gov/analysis/requests/federallands/pdf/eia-federallandsales.pdf. EIA’s estimates are 
based on data provided by the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) Office of Natural 
Resources Revenue (ONRR) and include sales of production from federal onshore and 
offshore lands, and from Indian lands. Id. at 1. 
 36. Id. at 4.  
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Comment, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The 
Unintended “Great Mischief for Indian Energy Development” and the Resulting Need for 
Reform, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 813 n.11 (2012).  
 39. Ludvig, supra note 3, at 728.   
 40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 29, at 1.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 6. 
 43. Eric Killelea, Resurrecting the Reservation, TALKIN’ THE BAKKEN, Nov. 2014, at 26. 
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recoverable oil in the Bakken.44 For Councilman Lewis Ken Hall of MHA’s 
Knife Clan, oil and gas resources beneath their reservation offer an 
extraordinary opportunity to achieve “sovereignty by the barrel,” a message 
that echoes throughout tribal communities in the region.45 Oil revenue 
payments on the reservation have reached more than $100 million over the 
past five years, drastically reducing an unemployment rate that was once 
over 70%.46 The reservation currently produces more than 330,000 barrels 
of oil every day, approximately a third of North Dakota’s total million-
barrel-per-day output.47 Since 2008, tribal members in the Bakken region 
have received more than $1 billion in oil tax revenue.48 Striving to rely 
wholly on themselves, as opposed to state or federal agencies, the MHA 
Nation tribal leaders believe oil is their “bargaining chip” to protecting 
sovereignty.49 
B. Steps Taken by Congress to Regulate Mineral Development on Tribal 
Lands 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the complexity involved in oil 
and gas development on tribal lands, it is important to become familiar with 
the land’s governing authorities. Generally, state laws and regulations do 
not apply within Indian reservation boundaries, leaving the reservations 
subject only to tribal and federal law.50 Unless an exemption exists, matters 
relating to Indian country are subject only to tribal and federal 
jurisdiction.51 If state interference would hinder tribal or federal law, the 
property or activities of nonmember Indians or non-Indians within Indian 
country also fall outside state regulation.52 Although a tribe’s ability to 
impose regulations on Indian land or federal trust land is generally 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Alex Demas, USGS Releases New Oil and Gas Assessment for Bakken and Three 
Forks Formations, USGS (May 2, 2013, 3:01 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/ 
usgs_top_story/usgs-releases-new-oil-and-gas-assessment-for-bakken-and-three-forks-forma 
tions/. 
 45. Killelea, supra note 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Mitchell Davis, Comment, Fractured Focus: Tribal Energy Development and the 
Regulatory Contest Over Hydraulic Fracturing in Indian Country, 4 WASH. & LEE J. 
ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T 305, 324 (2013) (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW § 3.04[1] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012)).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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unchallenged, the tribe’s ability to regulate may be limited if the regulation 
affects activities of nonmembers on non-Indian fee lands.53 In Montana v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that tribal regulations apply to 
nonmember Indians and non-Indians if they have entered a consensual 
relationship with the tribe, or if their activity has “some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”54 Further, “nonmember conduct or property does not necessarily fall 
under state jurisdiction simply because it falls outside tribal jurisdiction.”55 
States may not assert their authority over tribes or tribal lands when doing 
so would conflict with federal law or would interfere with tribal lawmaking 
rights.56 
Oil and gas development on tribal lands becomes even more complex 
when determining land ownership. Tribes and tribal members may own 
mineral estates within reservation boundaries, while tribes may also have 
rights in mineral estates that extend outside reservation boundaries where 
land was ceded for homesteading or federal use.57 Where lands are held in 
trust for a tribe or tribal member by the federal government—which acts as 
a trustee—the tribe or tribal member is the beneficial owner of the mineral 
estate and may have enforceable rights in cases of federal 
mismanagement.58 This introductory information shall act a precursor for 
the legislative history of government oversight on tribal lands that follows.  
The Leasing and Grazing Act of 1891 was the first law passed 
concerning mineral leasing on tribal lands.59 This act affirmed 
congressional consent of non-Indian mineral leasing on tribal lands and 
permitted ten-year leases with consent of the tribe.60 Over the next thirty 
years, additional acts stipulated longer lease terms and ultimately 
eliminated the requirement for tribal consent of leases in 1919.61 States 
were further permitted to tax production activities on tribal lands and the 
Secretary of the Interior was authorized to handle royalty and tax 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 405 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)).  
 55. Id. at 325. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Indian Law, GETCHES-WILKINSON CENTER FOR NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE 
ENV’T: INTERMOUNTAIN OIL & GAS BMP PROJECT, http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/laws/ 
tribal/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Getches-Wilkinson BMP Project Indian Law 
Page]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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transactions with the lessees and states on behalf of the tribe.62 Considered 
“haphazard, piecemeal legislation . . . [that] left the law governing mineral 
leases on tribal lands in a state of confusion,” early legislation was in need 
of clarification.63 Consequently, Congress enacted the IMLA to replace 
inconsistent earlier laws and clarify leasing regulations on Indian land.64 By 
ensuring a fair return on tribal minerals, the IMLA encouraged tribal self-
governance. It created a single set of leasing procedures for mineral 
development on tribal lands; further, all IMLA leases required tribal 
consent and approval from the Secretary of the Interior, which were to be 
granted on a competitive bidding basis.65 Under the IMLA, all leases were 
to be for a term of ten years and could only be extended if the minerals on 
the lease were being produced in paying quantities.66  
However, the IMLA contained some gaps and exceptions that have 
resulted in problems over the years. The IMLA did not incorporate all tribes 
and tribal lands, although it did preserve the right of tribes to lease lands for 
mining under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).67 The IRA allowed 
tribes to supersede DOI regulations for mining.68 Leases of allotted lands or 
of the allotment era leasing acts were not generally included in the IRA 
however. Moreover, a tribe did not have the authority to unilaterally cancel 
a lease for breach of the lease terms; this power continued to rest with the 
Secretary of the Interior or the courts.69 As an added layer of control, the 
IMLA excluded tribes from being involved in the mining process after the 
lease was authorized.70 This inevitably stripped tribes of the opportunity to 
regulate energy development on their land.  
Regulatory authority under the IMLA continued to waffle, and in 1977 
the DOI Solicitor determined that the IMLA did not authorize states to tax 
Indian mineral leases.71 In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court found that states 
could not tax Indian interests inside Indian country because Congress had 
not clearly consented to the transaction.72 The Supreme Court ruling in 
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico further complicated this rule by holding 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id; Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766-67 (1985). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/5
No. 2] COMMENTS 595 
 
 
that the IMLA did not bar state taxation of non-Indian lessees on Indian 
land.73  
The IMLA has also been held to establish a fiduciary duty between the 
federal government and tribes when leasing minerals, as reflected in United 
States v. Navajo Nation.74 Under Navajo Nation, the Secretary may only 
approve lease sales when they are “in the [best] interest of the Indians.” 
Furthermore, as long as the parties are involved in the mineral lease 
arrangement, the IMLA established federal jurisdiction over all claims 
involving mineral leasing operations.75 As sovereign, independent nations, 
tribes are immune from many state and federal taxes.76 Under the IMLA, 
tribes today have the right to tax oil and gas production from tribal lands 
and are exempt from paying state taxes on royalty payments procured from 
an oil and gas lease.77  
Signed into legislation on December 22, 1982, the IMDA expanded 
tribal authority by authorizing tribes to enter into agreements for oil and gas 
development.78 It allows an individual tribal member who possesses a 
mineral interest to include such resources in a tribal mineral agreement, if 
the parties to the agreement concur and the Secretary determines that such 
participation is in the individual’s best interest.79  
In 2005, Congress amended the Energy Policy Act of 199280 to establish 
the Indian Energy Resource Development Program.81 The purposes of the 
program are to “assist Indian tribes in the development of energy resources 
and further the goal of Indian self-determination.”82 The Secretary of the 
Interior accomplishes these tasks by providing grants for use in  
developing or obtaining the managerial and technical capacity 
needed to develop energy resources on Indian land,83 . . . . 
carrying out projects to promote the integration of energy 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Getches-Wilkinson BMP Project Indian Law Page, supra note 53; Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989). 
 74. Getches-Wilkinson BMP Project Indian Law Page, supra note 53; United States v. 
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 75. Getches-Wilkinson BMP Project Indian Law Page, supra note 53. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201-13574 (2012). 
 81. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2012). 
 82. Id. § 3502(a)(1). 
 83. Id. § 3502(a)(2)(A). 
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resources,84 [and] . . . . []establish[ing] a national resource center 
to develop tribal capacity to establish and carry out tribal 
environmental programs in support of energy-related programs 
and activities.85  
The Secretary also provides low-interest loans “for use in the promotion of 
energy resource development on Indian land.”86 Most notably, these 
amendments established the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act (ITEDSA) of 2005, which eliminates the need for 
Secretarial approval of certain qualifying leases.87 The ITEDSA gives tribes 
an opportunity to exercise greater control over their mineral resources.88 It 
represents a valiant step towards tribal self-determination by allowing tribes 
to negotiate their own energy resource agreements and manage any 
responsibilities associated with those agreements.89 No tribe has taken 
advantage of ITEDSA thus far, although it may be a viable alternative to 
government regulation for tribes seeking to administer their own 
regulations on hydraulic fracturing without complete BLM oversight.  
In September of 2012, the Senate’s Indian Affairs Committee presented 
the ITEDSA Amendments of 201290 to the 112th Congress (2011-2013), 
but the bill ultimately failed to be enacted.91 More recently, on May 21, 
2014, proposed amendments to the ITEDSA were again introduced to 
Congress but were also not enacted into legislation.92 Among other 
modifications, the 2014 amendments sought to direct the Secretary of the 
Interior to “provide technical assistance to interested Indian tribes to 
develop energy plans.”93  
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C. The BLM’s Obligation to Regulate 
The relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes is 
complex to say the least.94 Ownership of the subsurface mineral estate and 
the affected surface estate plays a critical role in determining who has the 
authority to regulate oil and gas development on tribal lands.95 In United 
States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians Of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held “that when lands are reserved or otherwise set 
aside for the tribes in executive order, treaties or agreements approved by 
Congress, the tribes held the beneficial rights to the soil and the mineral 
interests under the lands.”96  
On Indian trust lands, tribes retain ownership of the mineral resources, 
including oil and gas found therein.97 However, in many cases, tribes have 
been divested of title to the subsurface minerals. Particularly, lands falling 
under the General Allotment Act of 1887 call for greater consideration in 
determining who holds the mineral title to those lands.98 This act essentially 
isolated mineral rights of tribes by “allotting tribal lands to individual 
members of the tribe and then allowing those tribal members to sell off the 
lands in fee simple after a period of time.”99 Since the lands were sold in fee 
simple, the mineral estate and production rights were included in the 
transactions, which were generally made with non-Indians.100 
Consequently, as individual tribal members sold their parcels of land, the 
alienation of mineral rights from tribal member ownership rose. “In 1934 
Congress ended the General Allotment Act of 1887, and since then has 
been working with the tribes to reconsolidate former tribal trust lands.”101  
Today, the majority of reservation lands are held in trust for tribes by the 
United States.102 The origins of the trust relationship between the federal 
government and Native American Tribes can be found in two nineteenth 
century cases: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia103 and Worcester v. Georgia.104 
In Cherokee Nation, the Court held that instead of being classified as 
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“foreign states” within the meaning of the constitution,105 Indian tribes were 
to be considered “domestic dependent nations” that have an 
“unquestionable . . . right to the lands they occupy.”106 The Court equated 
the tribe’s relationship with the U.S. government as one resembling a “ward 
to his guardian.”107 Soon thereafter, in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court held 
that state law does not apply to tribal lands, and that “[t]he whole 
intercourse between the United States and this [Indian] nation, is by our 
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.”108  
Considered a trustee, the federal government has extensive control over 
minerals, including oil and gas, on tribal lands.109 With this control comes 
fiduciary obligations that have appeared ambiguous at times. The extent of 
these fiduciary duties were examined in a series of 1980s Supreme Court 
cases, generally referred to as the “Mitchell” series. Essentially, the cases 
revealed that depending on breadth or specificity of the act or statute 
involved, the federal government’s fiduciary obligation may be one of 
“bare trust”110 where the act forming the basis of the obligation is general, 
or, under a more narrowly tailored statute, this obligation may be 
heightened, such as when the federal government has “elaborate control 
over [natural resources] and property belonging to Indians.”.111   
The DOI regulates oil and gas development on tribal lands held in trust 
through the BIA and the BLM, which regulate surface and subsurface 
mineral rights, respectively.112 The BLM supervises and approves most oil 
and gas operations on tribal lands, although the BIA is responsible for 
issuing lease permits.113 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) “directs the BLM to manage the public lands so as to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation, and to manage those lands using the 
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principles of multiple use and sustained yield.”114 Under the FLPMA, 
public and tribal lands must be “managed in a manner that will protect the 
quality of their resources, including ecological, environmental, and water 
resources.”115 Both the IMLA and the IMDA assign regulatory authority 
over Indian oil and gas leases for trust lands to the Secretary of the 
Interior.116 In turn, the Secretary has delegated his or her authority to 
oversee operations on Indian mineral leases to the BLM under the Indian 
Allotted Lands Leasing Act and the Tribal Lands Leasing Act.117 
III. Fuel for the Fire: The Heated Debate  
The initial proposal of the BLM’s rule in May of 2012 sparked a great 
deal of interest that remained throughout the lengthy editing process. The 
final BLM rule brought with it an array of reactions ranging from praise 
and support to fierce criticism and scorn backed by lawsuits.118 A popular 
debate is whether or not the federal government is the best entity to be 
regulating oil and gas development on tribal lands. Supporters of state and 
local tribal regulation stress federal agencies are ill-equipped to handle 
environmental regulation on tribal lands.119 Local regulation advocates also 
emphasize the tribe’s superior understanding of certain religious and 
environmental concerns on their lands.120 In contrast, environmentalists 
concerned about the future of tribal lands push for greater federal 
government participation in this area and hope to see stricter regulations 
that protect the land for generations to come.  
In addition to debates over local and federal regulation, disputes 
concerning the truths and fabrications of environmental impacts of 
hydraulic fracturing have further complicated the discussion. Research 
regarding hydraulic fracturing and its possible negative effects on the 
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environment is relatively new and, as a result, a number of theories have 
developed about the practice, but for the time being they remain just that—
theories. The slurry of theories appearing in newspaper headlines across the 
nation have yet to be scientifically proven, although many attempt to equate 
correlation of hydraulic fracturing and environmental occurrences, such as 
water contamination, with absolute causation. 
A. Local vs. Federal Debate: Is the BLM the Proper Entity to Regulate? 
The BLM’s former regulation governing fracking on tribal lands is more 
than thirty years old and was not designed to address modern fracking 
technology.121 Section A of the existing regulation calls for a: 
[P]roposal for further well operations shall be submitted by the 
operator . . . for approval by the authorized officer prior to 
commencing operations to redrill, deepen, perform casing 
repairs, plug-back, alter casing, perform nonroutine fracturing 
jobs, recomplete in a different interval, perform water shut off, 
commingling production between intervals and/or conversion to 
injection.122  
This regulation is far less encompassing than the BLM’s recently published 
regulation. Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell stated the regulation 
provides “common-sense updates that increase safety while also providing 
flexibility and facilitating coordination with states and tribes.”123 She 
continued by saying, “[a]s we continue to offer millions of acres of 
America’s public [and tribal] lands for oil and gas development, it is 
important that the public has full confidence that the right safety and 
environmental protections are in place.”124  
The outdated prior rule leaves the majority of regulation up to state and 
tribal governments, although often times neither states nor tribes seek to 
implement a rule that would adequately regulate the highly technical and 
complex drilling method of hydraulic fracturing. Nonetheless, several tribal 
and industry leaders feel that fracking is best regulated at the local level 
because a “one-size-fits-all rule” on fracking operations is illogical.125 
                                                                                                                 
 121. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-2 (2014). 
 122. Id. § 3162.3-2(a).  
 123. Alysa Landry, New Rules to Address Fracking on Indian Lands, NAVAJO TIMES 
(May 23, 2013), http://navajotimes.com/politics/2013/0513/052313fra.php#.VRWKk1ymA 
f4. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Broder, supra note 12.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/5
No. 2] COMMENTS 601 
 
 
Advocates of local regulation argue geographic characteristics of oil and 
gas reserves vary significantly from state to state, and state officials are 
more knowledgeable about local and regional production techniques than 
federal agencies.126 Commentators believe that “on-the-ground knowledge 
leads to more effective regulation—regulation that is more specifically 
tailored to the characteristics of reserves in the location.”127 Additionally, 
since state officials are politically accountable to local residents, they will 
likely be more receptive to local concerns.128 Similarly, tribal regulation is 
also considered more effective because tribal leaders have more 
information about site locations, environmental impacts observed over time, 
and the economic needs of their tribe.129 The rule’s critics argue that 
environmental and social costs of fracking on tribal lands differ from tribe 
to tribe and even within each tribe.130 While many tribal leaders support 
increased drilling through hydraulic fracturing, others are strongly opposed 
to its religious and environmental consequences.131 The question thus 
remains, is it paternalistic to believe that tribes will not be able to resolve 
these conflicts without the helping hand of the federal government? 
In stark contrast to these beliefs, environmental groups and some tribal 
members continue to urge the federal government to take an increased role 
in regulating fracking operations.132 One initiative that environmentalists 
have lobbied for is the passage of the Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011 (the Frac Act), which would repeal 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and require operators to disclose 
fracking chemicals.133 Environmentalists seeking a more hands-on approach 
from the federal government fear that the states’ relaxed attitude towards 
the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing will result in damning 
repercussions for tribes and their lands.134 Supporters such as the 
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Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) welcomed the BLM’s final rule, 
believing the rule takes, “an important step toward addressing several 
critical issues associated with oil and gas development.”135 The EDF’s 
Associate Vice President, Mark Brownstein, continued by saying, “[b]ut 
states also play an important role here, and we strongly encourage [the] 
BLM to work constructively with them, as they have expertise, talent, and 
resources that must be engaged for effective oversight of these new 
rules.”136 
B. Fact or Fiction: Environmental Impacts of Fracking Are Devastating to 
Indian Country 
There is much uncertainty as to whether or not the injection of hydraulic 
frack fluid into the subsurface geology causes damage to the 
environment.137 The fluid injected into a well to fracture the surrounding 
rock is approximately 99% water and sand, with the remaining 1% 
comprised of some combination of over 200 chemicals.138 The oil and gas 
industry tends to emphasize the chemicals used in fracking fluid make up 
only a small percentage of the injected mixture, whereas those opposed to 
the practice believe that even though these chemicals constitute only a 
small percentage of the millions of gallons of fluid used in a single 
fracturing operation, this equates to hundreds of thousands of pounds of 
chemical additives likely to cause harm to the environment.139 Fracturing, 
or “frack” fluid disposal efforts are another area of serious concern for 
many. The Union of Concerned Scientists states that “the geological 
formations targeted for fracking are typically thousands of feet deeper than 
freshwater aquifers,” meaning it is essentially impossible for the upward 
migration of fluids to contaminate groundwater.140 Yet, adversaries of 
hydraulic fracturing argue that fracturing stimulation is not a precise 
science, making fracking a specifically targeted location thousands of feet 
underground very difficult.141 Despite the vast amount of research 
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conducted, at this point there is no scientific evidence that can verify any of 
these theories with 100% accuracy.  
In response to public concern, Congress requested that the EPA conduct 
a scientific study to examine the relationship between hydraulic fracturing 
and drinking water resources.142 In the recently released assessment, the 
EPA was unable to find evidence that certain hydraulic fracturing 
mechanisms, such as water withdrawals in times of low water availability, 
spills of hydraulic fracturing fluids and produced water, or fracturing 
directly into underground drinking water resources “have led to widespread, 
systemic impacts on drinking water resources in the United States.”143 The 
study found instances where one or more of these mechanisms impacted 
drinking water, but compared to the number of wells hydraulically fracked, 
the number was small.144 Although this report is the most comprehensive 
study conducted thus far, it does not take every potential groundwater 
contamination instance into consideration nor does it claim to do so.145  
The report has conjured up varying responses. Environmentalist argue 
the report proves fracking contaminates groundwater but leaves health 
concerns related to the contamination unanswered, whereas the report has 
left the oil and gas industry feeling confident in the safety measures already 
in place on fracking.146 Unfortunately, this report was unable to 
successfully put the issue to rest for good, and instead continues to fuel 
opposing parties with ammunition to fire at one another.   
C. Major Elements & Reactions of the Finalized BLM Regulation 
According to the BLM Press Release published March 20, 2015, the 
BLM’s rule provides a framework of safeguards and disclosure 
requirements that aim to protect public and American Indian lands from 
irresponsible development of oil and gas resources that could lead to an 
environmental disaster.147 Overall the rule seeks to improve safety and help 
protect groundwater through updated requirements on well-bore integrity, 
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wastewater disposal and public disclosure of chemicals.148 According to the 
BLM’s News Release on the final rule, the key components of the rule 
include: provisions for ensuring the protection of groundwater supplies by 
requiring a validation of well integrity and strong cement barriers between 
the wellbore and water zones through which the wellbore passes; increased 
transparency by requiring companies to publicly disclose chemicals used in 
hydraulic fracturing to the BLM within thirty days of completing fracturing 
operations through the website FracFocus; raised standards for interim 
storage of recovered waste fluids from hydraulic fracturing to mitigate 
environmental risks; and added measures to lower the risk of cross-well 
contamination with chemicals and fluids used in the fracturing operation, 
by requiring companies to submit more detailed information on the 
geology, depth, and location of preexisting wells to afford the BLM an 
opportunity to better evaluate and manage unique site characteristics.149 
A number of changes from previous drafts can be found throughout the 
rule. For example, companies will no longer be able to test a single well’s 
structural integrity to demonstrate the same for an entire group of similar 
wells.150 Instead, companies must submit an analysis of each well’s 
integrity before it can be hydraulically fractured.151 Additionally, except 
under limited exceptions determined on a case-by-case basis, operators are 
prohibited from using waste pits, even if they are lined, on drilling pads.152 
This will force companies to inject waste water and other recovered frack 
fluid into above ground, rigid enclosed, covered, or netted tanks.153 
Although companies do have to disclose any fracking chemicals used 
during operation to the public through the industry-backed website 
FracFocus, companies are still able to invoke trade secret exemptions on 
specific ingredients used in their frack fluid.154  
Like the initial and revised proposed rules, the final rule will apply to 
Indian lands, “to ensure that these lands and communities all receive the 
same level of protection as provided on public lands.”155 It is noted that a 
number of states such as Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming 
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already have regulations in place that address hydraulic fracturing 
operations.156 In an effort to prevent duplicative efforts, the final rule states 
that were state or tribal regulations to meet or exceed the BLM’s 
requirements, the state or tribe may obtain a “variance.”157 The variance 
will allow for the more protective state or tribal rule to be enforced in the 
alternative.158 
The rule also includes an express statement as to the importance of 
consulting with tribal leaders regarding the rule’s components.159 During 
the proposed rule stage and after the proposed and supplemental rules were 
published, the BLM held regional meetings with tribes in a number of cities 
across the nation.160 At each stage along the way, the BLM offered follow-
up one-on-one consultations and several such meetings were held with 
tribal leaders.161 One of the outcomes of these meetings formed the 
requirement that operators on Indian lands comply with applicable tribal 
laws.162 Whether or not these sessions adequately addressed the tribes 
concerns throughout the drafting process is disputed. For example, the 
Three Affiliated Tribes Chairman, Tex “Red Tipped Arrow” Hall, strongly 
expressed his distress about the lack of involvement on the rule’s creation 
in a letter to the Secretary of the U.S. DOI in May of 2012.163 Throughout 
the letter, Tex demonstrates circumstances where the BLM lacked tribal 
consultation regarding the hydraulic fracturing regulation.164 He states that 
“[p]roper tribal consultation is an expression of the unique legal 
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, the federal 
trust responsibility and our right to self-government.”165 
Despite opposing parties contrasting reactions to the final rule, it appears 
as though everyone can agree on one thing: the rule is all wrong. 
Environmental organizations argue that the rule is inadequate for 
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preventing potential risk of fracking,166 whereas industry groups such as the 
Independent Petroleum Association of America and the Western Energy 
Alliance showed their dissatisfaction by filing a lawsuit the same day the 
regulation was published.167 These industry groups argue that the rule’s 
duplicative nature is lacking scientific evidence to back its necessity.168 
Likewise, Wyoming quickly filed a lawsuit challenging the BLM’s final 
rule in the case of Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Case No. 15-CV-43-5 
(March 26, 2015), claiming the BLM’s final rule conflicts with the Safe 
Drinking Water Act and interferes with the state’s hydraulic fracturing 
regulations.169 North Dakota later joined Wyoming in this lawsuit against 
the BLM.170 Indian tribes were not silent either, expressing their concern 
that the rule too closely relates Indian land with federal lands.171   
IV. Suggested Options for Tribes  
It is without question that the BLM’s regulation is strongly disliked by 
many industry leaders, tribes, and commentators. Arguments made in favor 
of the BLM regulation are scarce, but still exist and should not be 
completely dismissed as being without merit.172 For tribal members like 
Theodora Bird Bear and Corey Sanders, fighting for their beloved land is a 
constant battle that they refuse to give up on.173 “You feel like you’re one 
person against a whole oil company system—what can you do?” expresses 
Sanders. “It’s like a spell and the money is too strong.”174 North Dakota oil 
extraction continues to rise, nearing one million barrels a day.175 “One oil 
tycoon calls North Dakota the next Saudi Arabia.”176 National 
environmentalists remain silent in the midst of all the production, and other 
environmentalists fear that locals in the region have become too lax about 
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the situation, having taken a “wait-and-see” attitude and assuming all is 
well as long as there is not a big disaster.177  
Unfortunately, major oil spills in North Dakota have occurred all too 
often, and have been exacerbated by regulators’ and operators’ failure to 
timely notify the public.178 In one instance, a farmer discovered a spill from 
a busted pipeline that oozed more than twenty thousand barrels of oil on his 
wheat fields.179 Documented as one of the largest spills in North Dakota’s 
history, the public was unaware of this disaster for eleven days.180 On a 
different occasion, a leak in an underground line sent 150 barrels of 
disposed salt water percolating into U.S. Forest Service land in North 
Dakota.181 Weeks later, an explosion ignited thirteen tanks and spilled 2,700 
barrels of salt water and oil.182 In the past two years, North Dakota has 
recorded 300 pipeline spills without alerting the public at all, although 
many have been minor.183 For tribal members like Bird Bear, the recent 
spills call for serious talk about how much environmental havoc this oil 
boom is causing the local ecosystem. “I expect to live here all my life, and I 
have a commitment to this land that was my folks’ land,” explains Bird 
Bear. “I just feel like I have an obligation to protect it, not only for me, but 
for the families that come after.”184 
Bird Bear, Sanders, and others with similar sentiments have lobbied for a 
bill to increase setbacks for wells drilled near homes.185 Bird Bear has 
“urged the state’s powerful Industrial Commission to slow down approving 
oil wells in the Killdeer Mountains, a spiritual place for tribal members,” 
albeit unsuccessfully.186 To complicate the situation, many tribal members 
who fear fracking operations are harming the environment also benefit from 
the oil boom by receiving large royalty checks for their mineral 
inheritance.187 In spite of the potential consequences to their land, revenues 
from oil and gas production are hard to turn down, for historically poverty-
stricken tribal members. Tribes are essentially torn between the urgent need 
to stimulate their economies and alleviate high poverty rates and protecting 
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their environment and respecting their lands.188 These often conflicting 
interests are at the root of the turmoil on tribal lands and are not much 
different than the conflicting interests seen in public lands across the nation. 
Some believe that they have found the solution to this complicated matter, 
but finding one solution that fulfills all interests involved seems to be a far 
cry from reality.  
Although the majority of commentators cannot see past the rule’s 
potentially negative consequences, subsection A below seeks to expose the 
rule’s highpoints, even if there are few. Also, since the rule is soon to be in 
effect, it might save operators the headache of a lawsuit or penalties to just 
embrace the rule’s requirements. Subsection B looks at an alternative 
approach tribes can take advantage of to maintain control over oil and gas 
development on their lands.  
A. Give It a Chance?: The BLM Rule in a More Positive Light 
This section is intended to be read with an open mind towards a rule that, 
for the time being, must be adhered to. The overwhelming amount of 
negative feedback the rule has received surely outweighs the positive 
aspects, but perhaps considering them will bring optimism in the future. In 
the words of the BLM’s Deputy Director, Mike Pool, the BLM regulation 
possesses several positive aspects that seek to “strengthen the requirements 
for hydraulic fracturing performed on . . . Indian trust lands in order to build 
public confidence and protect the health of American communities, while 
ensuring continued access to important resources to America’s energy 
economy.”189 To many adversaries of the regulation, the Deputy’s statement 
is likely nothing more than an eloquent attempt to bolster the BLM’s 
interests in the matter while at the same time placing unnecessary 
regulation on an already heavily burdened industry. However, for Natives 
like Bird Bear and Sanders, this regulation may be the answer to their 
prayers and a way for tribes to continue gaining economic prosperity while 
at the same time gaining protections that could help preserve their cherished 
lands.  
Regulatory power varies depending on numerous factors, such as 
whether the land is owned in trust or in fee simple and the status of the tribe 
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involved. As a result, several overlapping and conflicting regulatory 
schemes have evolved over the years.190 Some suggest the federal 
government should empower tribes to take on a role in administering 
environmental programs on tribal lands through acts such as the SDWA and 
the Clean Water Act (CWA).191 Yet simply enforcing these regulatory 
schemes may be inadequate to address the breadth of issues that accompany 
hydraulic fracturing. Current environmental programs do not govern a 
number of issues, from inspection to cleanup, which leaves gaping holes in 
current hydraulic fracturing regulation.192 Both the SDWA and the CWA 
allow the regulation of hydraulic fracturing but to a limited extent.193 The 
SDWA applies only to fracking operations where diesel fuels are used, a 
relatively small amount of overall fracking operations conducted.194 
Similarly, the CWA applies mostly to the disposal of hydraulic fracking 
wastewater into treatment works that flow into navigable waters, making it 
equally limited.195   
The BLM’s proposed regulation, however, provides more 
straightforward measures that are consistent with the American Petroleum 
Institute’s (API) guidelines for well construction and well integrity.196 A 
major motivation for a separate BLM rule is that states do not have the 
same trust responsibilities for Indian lands as the federal government.197 
Therefore, the rule expands and sets different standards from those states 
that currently regulate hydraulic fracturing operations but “do not need to 
adhere to the same resource management and public involvement standards 
appropriate on Federal lands [i.e. tribal lands] under Federal law.”198  
Even where current environmental regulatory programs allow for 
protection of Indian lands from improper fracking techniques, enforcement 
is likely lacking. Weak enforcement allows oil and gas operators to pollute 
tribal lands since there are no motivations to do otherwise.199 Whether or 
not the BLM regulation will deliver adequate government oversight and 
enforcement that ensures operators fulfill safety requirements is yet to be 
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determined. Commentators speculate that the BLM is likely to fail at 
effectively enforcing the new regulation on tribal lands due to a lack of 
adequate staffing, budget, and expertise needed to implement the rule.200 
Unfortunately, if the BLM is understaffed or unable to enforce its policies, 
and if there is no corresponding regulation by the tribes, there will 
essentially be no comprehensive, sufficient hydraulic fracking regulation on 
tribal lands, which is likely to result in continued destruction and unsafe 
development.201 The BLM admits that greater use of state or tribal 
standards or procedures could reduce compliance costs for operators and 
increase consistency but at the risk of inadequate enforcement.202 On Indian 
lands, the BLM reiterates it is responsible for enforcing all federal 
regulations and the terms of the leases, whereas tribes themselves must 
enforce tribal laws.203 Although an assurance alone may not be completely 
convincing to skeptics, the BLM has continually reiterated that it “will seek 
new and improved agreements to reduce regulatory burdens and to increase 
efficiency, while fulfilling the Secretary’s responsibilities mandated by 
statutes as . . . [the] trustee for Indian lands.”204  
Aside from filling a void in safety regulations that could cause 
widespread devastation to Indian lands and, arguably, offer better 
enforcement and more timely completion of fracking operations, the BLM’s 
proposed regulation also seeks to create a consistent oversight and 
disclosure model that will apply across all public and Indian lands that are 
available for oil and gas development.205 “State regulations [on Federal 
lands] pertaining to hydraulic fracturing operations are [currently] not 
uniform.”206  
One final consideration in favor of implementing the BLM’s regulation 
on tribal lands is that the rule allows tribes to forego the rule’s requirement 
through a variance.207 To be granted a variance, a tribe’s rule must “meet or 
exceed the effectiveness of the revised proposed rule,” which is to be 
determined by the BLM.208 “[T]ribes would be invited to work with the 
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BLM to craft variances that would allow technologies, processes or 
standards required or allowed by the State or tribe to be accepted as 
compliance with the rule.”209 The state of Colorado has taken advantage of 
the variance option by enacting a Memorandum of Agreement with the 
BLM (and the U.S. Forest Service) for Permitting and Oil and Gas 
Operations on BLM and National Forest Service Lands in Colorado.210 
Tribes are encouraged to pursue the same type of agreement on their lands, 
and although the contents of such agreements may differ from tribe to tribe, 
the agreements allow tribal agencies and the BLM to share standards, 
information, and processes that should yield more consistency for 
operators.211 The variance would be applied to all lands within the 
boundaries of the tribe that are proportionate to the tribal regulatory 
scheme.212 Regulatory consistency and predictability are attractive for 
operators seeking to explore hydraulic fracturing operations and, as a result, 
are likely to increase interest and exploration of oil and gas resources on 
tribal lands.  
After looking at the revisions to the regulation and considering harsh 
criticisms, it is hard to agree that the regulation possesses absolutely no 
positive attributes. Regulating mineral exploration on tribal lands is 
unlikely to please every skeptic or work with 100% efficiency. The rule’s 
primary goal of ensuring that hydraulic fracturing does not cause negative 
impacts to Indian resources is one that seems to be often forgotten amid all 
the criticism.  
Since the late 1980s state and local tribal regulation has primarily 
managed mineral extraction on tribal lands. Although a number of tribes 
have found economic prosperity through increased exploration and 
development, it has not come without costs. Allowing state and tribal 
regulation of fracking operations to continue without change may leave 
Native peoples, like Bird Bear and Sanders, with only memories of what 
they used to call home. Hydraulic fracturing has changed oil and gas 
extraction drastically and has enabled America to seek greater energy 
independence; for these reasons, it should not be hindered or restricted. The 
BLM and supporters similarly believe the rule will not slow production on 
tribal lands, and that implementing a comprehensive and modernized 
process will be ideal for tribes looking to protect their resources while at the 
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same time safely and effectively increasing oil and gas production through 
hydraulic fracturing.  
B. Tribes Seeking Self-Determination to Take Advantage of the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act 
Aside from seeking a variance, there exists another option for tribes who 
wish to govern their own energy leases without hardly any interference 
from the federal government. Passed by Congress in 2005 as part of the 
larger Energy Policy Act of 1992, the ITEDSA allows tribes to achieve this 
goal.213 Under ITEDSA, a tribe can enter into a Tribal Energy Resource 
Agreement (TERA) with the DOI, and if approved, the agreement will 
govern the interactions between the Secretary of the Interior and the tribe 
involved.214 Thus, tribes no longer need Secretarial approval for leases 
involving mineral development once a TERA is in place.215 In order for the 
Secretary to place his or her stamp of approval on a tribal TERA, a few 
prerequisites must be met: 
First, the Secretary must find that the tribe has “sufficient 
capacity to regulate the development of energy resources of the 
Indian tribe.” Second, the agreement itself must provide for 
periodic review of the tribe’s compliance with the agreement’s 
terms by the Secretary. Third, the proposed resource agreement 
must contain provisions authorizing the Secretary to take 
necessary action to protect trust assets that are in “imminent 
jeopardy” as a result of violation of the resource agreement or 
other applicable federal law. And finally, the agreement must 
contain certain provisions with respect to the leases, business 
agreements, or rights-of-way that will be entered into under the 
resource agreement.216  
Although the ITEDSA’s purpose was to free tribes from a multitude of 
burdens and complex regulatory schemes that have evolved in energy 
development on Indian land, criticisms of the act have masked these 
attributes. Among others, some of the most prevalent criticisms include: (1) 
Secretarial approval of prerequisites are “rather cumbersome,” especially 
when tribes are without sufficient money and expertise to enter into a 
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TERA;217 (2) “[t]raditional notions of tribal sovereignty [that] protect tribes 
from incursion of . . . non-members in the decisionmaking process” are 
violated;218 and (3) uncertainty regarding the federal government’s fiduciary 
responsibility regarding tribes that enter into a TERA.219 A closer look at 
the act and the criticisms associated with it reveal that tribes are in no way 
barred from taking advantage of this act. As one commentator expresses, 
“TERAs should be seen for what they are: the best option for tribes who 
want to maximize their control over the development of tribal energy 
resources.”220 
Lacking money and expertise to take advantage of the ITEDSA is a 
common concern. However, under the ITEDSA, the Secretary has been 
directed to “provide development grants to Indian tribes . . . for use in 
developing or obtaining the managerial and technical capacity needed to 
develop energy resources on Indian land.”221 Section 3503(c) of the statute 
expands on the obligations of the United States by  
ensur[ing], to the maximum extent practicable and to the extent 
of available resources, that on the request of an Indian tribe, the 
Indian tribe shall have available scientific and technical 
information and expertise, for use in the regulation, 
development, and management of energy resources of the Indian 
tribe on Indian land.222  
Therefore, the statute itself provides for financial and technical assistance 
on behalf of the federal government for tribes pursing a TERA. 
Tribes irrefutably have resources available to them if they wish to take 
advantage of the statute’s assistance. Unfortunately, concerns regarding 
whether or not the federal government will follow through on these 
promises are not unwarranted.223 Congress’ past performance on similar 
financial obligations leaves many skeptics weary of why this act would be 
any different than others in the past.224 Although financial inability will be a 
bar for some tribes, others are likely to already possess the financial and 
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technical resources to enter into a TERA with the government.225 Tribes 
with less financial security still have the ability to meet TERA standards by 
working with the federal government. Smaller-scale renewable energy 
projects can be used to build up to the standards necessary for tribes to enter 
into a resource agreement with the Secretary.226 Gradually building upon 
their expertise, tribes seeking to develop their own energy resources can 
enhance their understanding of the industry and gain greater control over 
energy regulations on their land.  
Another cause for concern is the act’s “notice-and-comment” language 
that commentators argue “‘conflict[s] sharply with tribal self-
governance.’”227 Under the notice-and-comment requirement, “tribes must 
incorporate processes to allow for public comment before final tribal 
approval of the leases, right-of-ways, and any other development 
instruments.”228 Non-Indian commentators, however, are unlikely to alter 
the Secretary’s decision-making process in approving TERAs since the 
purpose of the public input is not to determine whether or not a tribe will be 
granted a resource agreement, but instead is used as an information-
gathering tool to track compliance with the tribes’ resource agreement.229 
Therefore, as long as a tribe complies with the terms of their resource 
agreement, public commentary will have little to no effect on any 
substantive decisions administered by the Secretary.230  
Still, others would rather see the ITEDSA completely amended. In 
September, 2012, the Senate’s Indian Affairs Committee passed the 
ITEDSA Amendments of 2012 in hopes of encouraging more tribes to 
pursue this option.231 This would allow certain actions to be excluded from 
environmental reviews and no longer require tribes to have sufficient 
capacity to develop resources to qualify for a TERA.232 However, this 
amendment died in committee and a new amendment was introduced on 
March 13, 2014. Perhaps one reason why the 2012 amendments were not 
enacted is that regulating certain modern drilling techniques, such as 
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hydraulic fracturing, requires extensive regulatory oversight. Oil spills have 
left some tribal lands in poor condition and displaced tribal members from 
their beloved homes. Striking a balance between efficient regulation of 
energy extraction techniques like hydraulic fracturing, ensuring safety, and 
preventing unnecessary destruction of tribal lands is a difficult task. Tribes 
that are not equipped with the necessary comprehensive environmental 
regulatory scheme will almost assuredly run into the same issues that 
currently exist on tribal lands. By requiring prerequisite capacity to qualify 
for a TERA, the federal government can assure that tribal lands held in trust 
are still protected while at the same time presenting tribes with the 
opportunity to regulate their own energy development. 
V. Conclusion 
Through the implementation of this rule, the BLM has placed sweeping 
regulations on a portion of lands that unquestionably contributes to 
America’s overall oil and gas production. Although the rule may come with 
a limited number of beneficial components, it does attempt to respond to 
growing concerns. Most consider the rule to be “a-swing-and-a-miss,” 
despite the fact that the rule has yet to be in effect for a single day. Perhaps 
with time the rule will prove to be a surprisingly valuable directive. Just 
perhaps.  
The BLM’s regulation has stirred a flurry of concerns regarding tribal 
sovereignty, government oversight, and environmental impacts of hydraulic 
fracturing. The vast number of arguments made in favor and in 
contradiction of the regulation placed great pressure on the DOI to produce 
a regulation that incorporates these opinions while at the same time keeping 
the best interest of tribes in mind. Commentators who sought complete 
abandonment of the rule’s regulation and who view state and tribal 
regulation as the most efficient and appropriate solution to increasing 
energy development of state and tribal resources continue to make 
convincing arguments. Nonetheless, the BLM has created a rule that—with 
tribal and industry cooperation—has the potential to greatly expand energy 
development through hydraulic fracturing in a safe and effective manner.  
Increased political instability abroad makes now (more than ever) the 
time to increase domestic production. Hydraulic fracturing has completely 
altered the energy industry by generating resource recovery from 
formations previously considered economically unprofitable. Reservations 
across the nation situated atop millions of barrels of untapped natural 
resources have—through hydraulic fracturing—been given a prominent seat 
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at America’s energy market table. Decades of legislation have complicated 
mineral development on tribal lands and, as a result, have placed barriers 
upon tribes seeking to develop their resources. The BLM regulation 
specifically regulates the most prominent method of oil and gas extraction 
on tribal lands—hydraulic fracturing. Enacting a comprehensive rule that 
incorporates fracking regulations, previously adopted by several states, will 
ensure tribal lands are protected from unnecessary destruction while at the 
same time implementing a procedure to streamline the process and reduce 
delays.  
Tribes have worked extremely hard to protect their sovereignty. 
Reflected through more recent legislation, the federal government has 
become a strong supporter of increasing tribal self-determination by 
removing archaic and overly oppressive government regulations. According 
to the BLM, this rule does not seek to infringe on tribal sovereignty but 
rather purports to modernize hydraulic fracturing regulation in hopes of 
boosting oil and gas extraction by establishing necessary requirements to 
protect tribal lands for generations to come. Viewed as a controversial time 
in America’s energy industry, advanced studies, regulations, and lawsuits 
will undoubtedly be interesting and spur more debate in this arena. Often 
taking on more responsibility then is necessary, the government clearly 
believes the regulation of hydraulic fracturing on tribal lands is a 
responsibility that has gone unattended for far too long. Tribes and industry 
leaders see the opposite side of the coin, such that the BLM has burdened 
tribes and operators with an intrusive regulation that will be 
counterproductive.  
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